

EAST TIMOR'S NATIONAL LITERACY CAMPAIGN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR A POST-CONFLICT DEMOCRACY¹

Bob Boughton

University of New England Armidale NSW Australia 2351

bob.boughton@une.edu.au

In Timor-Leste, the majority of the country's adults have had little or no schooling. The illiteracy rate nationally, according to the 2004 Census, was 46%, and was much higher among older people, women and people in rural areas. The paper analyses the context, origins and achievements of first twelve months of Timor-Leste's national literacy campaign, which was launched in the midst of the 2006 political violence by the previous FRETILIN-led government, supported by a team of Cuban technical advisers. It explores the way the political crisis and the literacy campaign interacted, as powerful forces combined to undermine the radically egalitarian thrust of the campaign. It concludes that, unless the momentum of the campaign is regained by the new AMP government which took power in June 2007, illiteracy will continue to undermine the prospects for Timor-Leste's independent development.

¹ This paper was presented to the 17th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne 1-3 July 2008. It has been peer reviewed via a double blind referee process and appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright. This paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation.

During the attempted coup against the FRETILIN-led government in Timor-Leste in mid 2006, triggered by a rebellion among disaffected members of the new nation's security forces, rioting youth gangs targeted public buildings across Dili. The Ministry of Education was no exception; two attempts were made to firebomb it, and the main building was only secured after a detachment of loyalist soldiers were barracked in the Conference Hall. A few hundred metres away, down a side lane, the Ministry's Directorate of Non-Formal Adult Education was also attacked. According to staff working there at the time, the attackers directed their anger in particular at the presence of a group of Cuban advisers who were working on the pilot classes for a new national literacy campaign, known by its Portuguese name, *Sim! Eu Posso* (Yes! I Can). The anti-Cuban sentiments of the rioters resonated with anti-government propaganda accusing the FRETILIN Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri, of being a communist.

The attacks forced a temporary closure of the Directorate, but the Cuban advisers and their Timorese counterparts did not stop working. They moved the pilot classes from Dili to other districts, and completed them by the end of that year. The materials were revised, and in March 2007, the campaign was officially launched with a ceremony in the main square in Dili, in front of the *Palacio do Governo*. The Council of Ministers created a National Commission to lead the campaign, chaired by the Minister of Education, and allocated US\$800,000, from the government's own budget, for the purchase of equipment, production of materials and the employment of staff. In the following months, a 'monitor' to lead the classes was recruited from every one of the country's 442 *sucos* (local administrative areas), and trained in the *Sim Eu Posso* method, along with coordinators for the sixty five Sub-districts and thirteen Districts, all local Timorese staff. A Campaign Secretariat was established, staffed mainly by students from the National University (UNTL) who volunteered to join the program in the final year of their studies. Throughout the first half of 2007, the massive logistical job of moving equipment and materials to the districts continued, drawing on the resources and vehicles of other government departments and the army (F-FDTL). All this took place against the backdrop of continuing violence and instability, the presence of a large international security force, and the preparations and conduct of general elections for the Presidency and the National Parliament.

In June 2007, the newly-elected President, Jose Ramos Horta and the FRETILIN Prime Minister, Estanislau Da Silva, opened the first class in Dili, in the *suco* of Metiaut, on the beach east of Dili. The venue was a restaurant owned by the *Chefe do Suco*, who made a building on his land available for the campaign. Under the glare of media cameras and the eyes of numerous Ministry officials, the first class moved haltingly through their audio-visual lesson, projected on a large TV screen. Every few minutes, the monitor, a local woman, turned off the DVD, and asked the class questions. In *sucos* all over the country, the same scene was repeated in subsequent months, but without quite the level of pomp and ceremony. *Chefes Dos Sucos* and local officials launched classes; introduced monitors, coordinators and Cuban advisers to the village; and welcomed groups of illiterate adults who joined the classes. By December 2007, classes were running in more than half of the country's 442 *sucos*, and already the first three thousand participants had graduated from the 13-week program.

As in every other newly-independent country where such a campaign has been attempted, the key to success is political will (Arnové & Gaff 1987). Unfortunately, in recent months (this is being written in June 2008), the national political consensus on the need for a mass literacy campaign in Timor-Leste has begun to recede, undermined by the continuing political crisis which the elections failed to resolve. In the absence of a leadership focused on the campaign, the Ministry of Education has been overtaken by a new donor-inspired agenda, which downplays efforts to overcome adult illiteracy in favour of a focus on schools, and particularly on basic education, as the overwhelming priority of public education; while relegating as much as possible of the of the Ministry's other responsibilities to the private and non-government sector. This is being accompanied by administrative decentralisation, reducing the capacity for centralised national leadership and co-ordination, which the literacy campaign requires. By April 2008, only sixty *sucos* still had *Sim Eu Posso* classes running. In another two hundred, equipment which had been delivered for the campaign stood idle, the audiovisual equipment unable to operate because of lack of fuel for the generators which power it, or because of an inability to maintain and secure it. Monitors had not been paid for months, and co-ordinators and the Cuban advisers were unable to move around their districts, again for lack of fuel for their motorcycles and second-hand cars. The equipment still to be delivered to the

remaining sub-districts and sucos was stockpiled in Dili, unable to move for want of vehicles, fuel, and money to pay drivers. Houses in the districts which were rented for the Cuban advisers had not had their rent paid for months, and some had been evicted. This was occurring despite the newly-elected *Alliance Maiores Partidos* (AMP) publicly supporting the campaign. Prime Minister Gusmao spoke in favour of the campaign and thanked the Cubans for their work at the graduation ceremony in November 2007; and his government has allocated more than sufficient money to continue the campaign in its budget. Moreover, shortly after being appointed, the AMP Minister of Education, Dr Joao Cancio, signed a new two year agreement with the Cuban Ambassador, to bring thirty five technical advisers to Timor in February this year, to replace the original team of eleven, who had completed their two-year mission.

This paper suggests that the very problem which the campaign seeks to overcome, namely the massive illiteracy in the country as a whole, is a root cause of the social and political instability which interrupted the campaign and still threatens to derail it. This analysis derives from the 'popular education' tradition in the field of adult education, which links mass education with the struggle for democracy and egalitarian political and economic development (Crowther et al 2005). The literacy campaign, I suggest, was initiated by the FRETILIN government of Mari Alkatiri, with significant support from progressive civil society organizations, because they were aware of, and identified with, that tradition, which was an important part of their anti-colonial heritage (Cabral & Martin-Jones 2008); and they were well aware of the dangers which mass illiteracy posed to their radically nationalist and social democratic development program (Durnan 2005:197). The FRETILIN leadership found a natural ally in Cuba, because it too had a long tradition of using mass education as a development strategy, and of resistance to attempts by bigger powers to undermine its sovereignty (Leiner 1987). It remains to be seen whether the development model which prevails in the future in Timor-Leste will allow sufficient space for the radically-egalitarian impulse which this successful South-South solidarity development project encapsulates so well.

Literacy and Illiteracy in Timor-Leste

Barely a document emerges from government, donors, NGOs or international agencies which does not call attention to the very high rate of illiteracy in Timor-Leste. The poorest country in Asia, it is also one of the smallest, with a population at the 2004 census of 923,198 people. Of these, 520,265 are aged 15 and over. Forty-six percent (46%), close to half, identified as illiterate. Women were more likely to be counted as illiterate than men, 52% compared with 40%. People over thirty were much more likely to be illiterate than those under, 62% compared with 25%. In rural areas, many of the more remote subdistricts and *sucos* had illiteracy rates of 70% and higher; and youth illiteracy was highest in the rural districts which experienced most disorder during the crisis (data computed from original tables from the 2004 Census).

In accordance with international practice, the illiteracy rate in Timor-Leste is calculated as the proportion of the population aged fifteen and above who are unable to read or write a simple sentence about their own life in any one of the two official or two working languages of the country.² This does not mean that non-literates are ignorant, or uninformed, or that they do not know their own interests; or that they do not have an enormous store of Indigenous and local knowledge, gained over centuries. It does mean, however, that they are inevitably restricted in their ability to engage in some of the most basic activities of democratic participation; and they are also hugely disadvantaged in terms of engagement with any modern economy. Just as importantly, people without literacy are also open to political manipulation, through the spreading of un-tested rumour, and their inability to access reliable sources of public information.

There are many other downsides to such a high rate of illiteracy, for both the people themselves, and for the country as a whole. Illiteracy is strongly associated with other aspects of poverty and under-development, including high maternal and infant mortality rates, high fertility rates, a reliance on traditional low productivity farming methods, dependence on middle men for marketing, and low incomes (Archer 2005). In a newly-emerging country, with little experience of governing and administering itself, one of the biggest problems is that high illiteracy among adults holds back the

² The Constitution recognises two official languages, Tetum, an indigenous language, and Portuguese; and two working languages, Indonesian and English

performance of children in schools, which, in turn, reduces the number of people who graduate from high school able to go on to higher education and become public servants and professionals. This seriously reduces the pool of people from which the country can draw for its future political, cultural and economic development leadership, and makes it much more likely that a privileged elite will emerge from the small middle class, while the mass of the people will continue to live in poverty. Illiteracy among the majority of the adult population also makes it much harder to dislodge such an elite once its power becomes entrenched, especially where there has been no previous experience of democracy. To significantly reduce the rate of illiteracy is therefore a political and a development imperative, for those who are committed to social justice and equality. Literacy, as many have said before, is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of peace, democracy and basic human rights (Lind 2008; Boughton & Durnan 2007).

Why Cuba?

In the pantheon of national literacy campaigns, Cuba's 1961 literacy crusade holds a special place. In that year, Fidel Castro's new revolutionary government sent thousands of young high school students to the country side, to teach the peasants to read and write (Leiner 1986). Jose Manuel 'Leira' Garcia, known to his colleagues as Leira, was one of those young students. Now in his sixties, Leira works as a senior administrator in a regional education department in Cuba. However, since February 2006, he has been in Timor-Leste, having taken leave from his job to work as the Coordinator of the Cuban technical team which his government sent over following a request from PM Alkatiri in December 2005. Leira is a veteran of Cuban internationalism, having also fought in Angola with the Cubans sent there to reinforce the independence army of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola), where he learned Portuguese.

Cuba's experience with its own literacy campaign, which reduced illiteracy from 24% to 4%, as well as its long tradition of supporting pre- and post- independence adult education in developing countries has aroused significant interest around the world (Hickling-Hudson 2004). In September 2000, the Cuban government responded by establishing an agency to support the dissemination of its work, a Research Department for Youth and Adult Literacy and Education within the Pedagogical

Institute for Latin America and the Caribbean (IPLAC) in Havana. Building on experience in a radio-based literacy campaign in Haiti in 1999, the IPLAC researchers developed *Yo! Si Puedo*, a method which combines numeracy acquisition with learning the basic letters of the alphabet, then building from this to construct simple words, phrases and sentences (Lind et al 2006). IPLAC understood that it is not possible to lower illiteracy rates on a national scale in most countries where the need is greatest without a low cost simple mass method, capable of reaching very large numbers of illiterate adults in a short space of time. It therefore devised a method which combines distance education technology with a national system of political mobilisation, control and coordination, allowing the use of relatively untrained local ‘monitors’, backed up by highly-skilled technical advisers. By December 2005, when Alkatiri visited Cuba, the IPLAC program had been adopted in fifteen countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guinéa Bissau, Haïti, Honduras, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela (Lind et al 2006).

The Three Elements of the Campaign³

The Cuban model has three basic elements. The first, and most important, is a national structure for socialisation, mobilisation and political support for the campaign. This occurs through a system of Commissions, beginning with a National Commission, and, below this, a series of functional Sub-Commissions, each of which takes responsibility for a particular aspect of the campaign. This is a ‘whole-of-government, whole-of-society model’; most government Ministries are expected to take part in at least one Sub-Commission, and representatives of civil society and the churches also sit on the National Commission and its Sub-Commissions. Below this layer, the National Commission is mirrored also by Sub-Commissions in each District and Sub-District, so that people with local authority can help drive the campaign, and provide it with political and material support. One of the main challenges to date in Timor-Leste has been setting up sustainable versions of this structure. At the time of writing, the National Commission had not met since the elections, nor had any Sub-Commissions, other than in a few districts.

The second element in the model is the literacy classes. Groups of 12 people meet in community facilities or, more often, the homes of local ‘monitors’, to watch a sequenced set of sixty-five one hour lessons on DVD. Ideally, a class completes five lessons per week, and finishes the course in thirteen weeks. The DVD shows an actual lesson, taught by a qualified literacy teacher, to a group of 4-5 ‘actor-students’. The suco-based monitor is trained to stop and start the lesson, to allow the ‘real’ class to practice the exercises modelled on the TV screen, using pre-prepared exercise books. The monitor’s other tasks include maintaining the equipment, recruiting the class, keeping attendance lists, and administering regular assessments to map progress through the course. Each new group enters and leaves the program with a ‘ceremony’, presided over by suco, sub-district and district officials. Classes are visited regularly by coordinators and the Cuban advisers, for quality control and support. Monitors receive ongoing professional development.

³ This section is based on the author’s interviews with the Cuban technical team and observation of their work on the campaign. A similar account can be found in Lind et al (2006), a study of the method’s implementation in Venezuela and Mozambique.

The third and final element is known as the ‘post-literacy’ phase. Because all that can be achieved in the thirteen week course is a most basic form of literacy, it is imperative that these skills are consolidated, if the newly-acquired literacy is not to be lost in a fairly short time. A range of different activities were to be planned for this purpose, including ongoing formal literacy classes to develop reading and writing skills; functional literacy activities in specific areas, such as agricultural extension, health promotion and citizenship education; local library and book/magazine distribution schemes; continuing classes through local school teachers; and vocational skills courses. However, almost all the available energy and resources have to date been expended on getting the first and second elements in place, and in particular on getting the first intake of students through the first set of classes. Consequently, this post-literacy phase has received little attention beyond some initial planning. As the first graduates completed their initial course over six months ago, this is becoming an urgent problem. There is a specific national-level Sub-Commission charged with responsibility for this element of the campaign, but at the time of writing, it had only had one meeting.

The ‘campaign’ model is quite different from other models of literacy teaching, and it has been difficult to get Ministry of Education officials and advisers to understand and embrace it, especially those Ministry officials with experience of literacy classes during Indonesian times. One of the most difficult ‘sticking points’ for senior officials is the requirement for them to share leadership and encourage active involvement in the campaign from other Ministries, political and church leaders, and civil society organizations, in an area which has previously been seen as ‘their’ sole responsibility.

Local Context

The most important aspect of the local context was that this was not the country’s first experience of a national literacy campaign. Timor-Leste’s first literacy campaign was initiated by FRETILIN in 1974-5, in the aftermath of the April 1974 ‘Carnation Revolution’ in Portugal, which overthrew the fascist regime there. A group of Timorese university students studying in Portugal began work on the campaign in May 1974, at the *Casa de Timor* in Lisbon. For several months, they worked on the development of a campaign manual in Tetum, the most widely-used Indigenous language. The students were influenced by the work of Paulo Freire, who visited

Lisbon at this time, and by the writings of African independence leaders Amilcar Cabral and Samora Machel (Durnan 2005:95). When they returned to their country, these young leaders mobilised high school students through a FRETILIN-organised students union, UNETIM. The students were trained in the use of the manual, then sent to villages in rural areas where they had family, to open literacy classes (Hill 2000: 208).

In the 1990s, in the final phase of the independence struggle, a group of Timorese students studying in Indonesia formed the Sahe Study Club, named after Vicente Sahe, the FRETILIN leader who had led the literacy campaign and political education work in the District of Baucau, and who was killed by the Indonesian army in 1978. Like the first generation before them, this new generation of Timorese students studied the work of Cabral and Machel, and other anti-colonialist writings, and found their way also to the work of the Brazilian popular educator, Paulo Freire. After independence, these activists began campaigning for a revival of the work of the first generation, and they found some support from international NGOs who also had experience with popular education and literacy campaigns, especially Oxfam Great Britain. In 2002, the Sahe Institute⁴, the re-named Sahe Study Club, helped form a popular education network, Dai Popular, with a group of similarly-minded local NGOs (Durnan 2005). At the First National Education Conference, a meeting between government and civil society held in April 2003, they called on the government to “carry out a national campaign for the elimination of illiteracy that integrates all aspects of communities' life”. (Oxfam Great Britain, 2003: 7, 62) The same group of activists, supported by Oxfam, then helped mobilise government and donor support to hold the First National Literacy Conference in September 2004. That Conference, which was opened by the PM, concluded with an unanimous call for action to address adult illiteracy, in the form of a national literacy campaign (Gutteres 2004). In 2007, the Minister of Education appointed two of Dai Popular's leaders to assist her by setting up a campaign Secretariat. These two activists mobilised over seventy university students to join the campaign. Some went to the districts to work as literacy class monitors in their own villages, others worked alongside the Cuban advisers and district and sub-district coordinators to help with mobilisation and

⁴ In 2007, the Sahe Institute again changed its name, to the Institute for Popular Education.

logistics, while a small core group staffed an office in the Non-Formal Adult Education Directorate in Dili, where they worked on logistics and mobilisation, and helped build a comprehensive database of the campaign.

What are the main obstacles the campaign faces?

Despite such strong roots in Timorese history, the campaign has not yet achieved the momentum it needs to succeed. The biggest obstacle has been the political crisis itself. Within weeks of the arrival of the Cuban advisers and the commencement of the first pilot classes on 2nd February 2006, the conflict within the army, which began in January with a petition from troops alleging discrimination, started to escalate. The crisis erupted when a demonstration by striking soldiers and their supporters in the last week of April turned violent, and in May there was fighting between loyalist and rebel elements of the army and police force in Dili. The arrival of the International Stabilisation force stopped further escalation, and there was some de-escalation following PM Alkatiri's resignation on 26 June. But by then over 100,000 people, mostly Dili residents, were living in refugee camps, and sporadic violence continued until well after the election cycle ended in July 2007. The violence and resulting instability of the coup attempt completely disrupted the operations of the State, including the Ministry of Education. In the weeks prior to the Presidential elections in early 2007, the bureaucracy became more dysfunctional, as different groups jockeyed for power. Inside the Ministry of Education, two of the opposition parties wielded significant influence; and their members in key positions actively blocked the FRETILIN Minister's attempts to implement her program.

In such a volatile situation, it was not unusual to hear some bureaucrats and international advisers claiming that the national literacy campaign was a thinly-veiled attempt by FRETILIN to mobilise its own support base in the districts. This view resonated with a common view among international education advisers about the inappropriateness of state-led mass literacy campaigns, and the preference of UNICEF, the World Bank, and bilateral donors like USAID and AUSAID for more dispersed, NGO-led literacy classes outside the direct control of the state (Lind 2008; Boughton, in press). In fact, the evidence contradicted the accusation of political bias in the campaign. For example, a significant number of the monitors and sub-district coordinators were openly aligned to other parties, and one of the most senior Ministry

staff members working with the Cubans was an active member of the Central Committee of an opposition party, ASDT. Perhaps the historical precedent of the 1975 literacy campaign was a factor in this perception that it was only a FRETILIN election strategy. However, even a cursory examination of the instructional materials, such as the DVDs, which had been made for Brazil, the monitors' handbooks and the student exercise books, would have confirmed that the material was far from political. What was political, however, was the government's determination to eradicate illiteracy, as the basis for developing Timor-Leste into a more egalitarian society.

The use of materials in Portuguese in the pilot and first phase of the campaign created another obstacle. The National Civil Society Education Conference in 2003 had argued that the national literacy campaign should be undertaken using Tetum and mother-tongue materials. This echoed the 1975 literacy campaign experience; but it also resonated with a strong anti-Portuguese sentiment which existed in the English-speaking international community, especially in UNICEF which was the major international donor in the education sector; and also among several World Bank advisers in the Ministry. In fact, the Cuban advisers had already concluded that they needed materials in Tetum as well as Portuguese. Once the pilot projects were completed, they produced supplementary materials in Tetum so that the monitors could work in both languages. These were produced in time for the start of the monitors training in April 2007. A set of DVDs in Tetum has since been produced, and is awaiting government funds for duplication.

A third obstacle to the successful roll-out of the national literacy campaign is the problem of the Timorese civil service, particularly the Ministry of Education (ME) and the Ministry of Planning and Finance (MPF). In addition to obstruction by senior officials who were politically-active opponents of the government, there were also serious problems of both corruption and inefficiency, which tended to interact with each other. As the students in the campaign secretariat quickly discovered, the struggle against illiteracy is also a struggle against bureaucracy and corruption; and even when the Minister and the Council of Ministers were totally committed to a rapid roll out of the campaign, it was insufficient to make things happen at the pace required. It is therefore not surprising that, since the change of government and the

downgrading of that commitment in favour of the new donor-led education agenda, there has been a further slowing down in the campaign.

Conclusion

The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that the national literacy campaign which FRETILIN initiated is faltering because it generated significant opposition across a broad range of social forces, all of which see their own interests in not supporting such a campaign. Whether for ideological reasons, or because they have other priorities, or because they favour an alternative development model, or simply because they do not understand it sufficiently to support it, it is also true that no other way is being proposed to seriously reduce, let alone eradicate, the problem of illiteracy within a ten-year timeframe. Objectively speaking, then, the campaign's opposition will, if allowed to prevail, take Timor-Leste in a direction which will lead to more, rather than less, social and political inequality. That is the bald truth of the matter, since every year, over 8000 more young people reach adulthood without acquiring even a rudimentary education from the school system, and these young people come overwhelmingly from families and areas where illiteracy is already very high. The evidence has been indisputable for decades that mass illiteracy cannot be eradicated by schooling alone, that it requires an adult education system, one which operates outside the formal school system, to work alongside the schools before national literacy rates rise in any significant measure. Despite all the problems a post-conflict situation poses for mounting such a campaign, it is hard to envisage a more effective strategy to end the inequalities underlying the conflict. Timor-Leste's national literacy campaign promises what almost no other development intervention can - a pathway to greater social and political equality and a more effective democracy.

References

- Archer, D. (2005). *Writing the Wrongs. International Benchmarks on Adult Literacy*. Johannesburg: Global Campaign for Education.
- Arnove, R. F., & Graff, H. J. (Eds.). (1987). *National Literacy Campaigns. Historical and Comparative Perspectives*. New York & London: Plenum Press.
- Boughton, B. (In press). Challenging donor agendas in adult & workplace education in Timor-

- Leste. In L. Cooper & S. Walters (Eds.), *Learning/Work. Critical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning and Work*. Capetown, South Africa: HSRC Press.
- Boughton, B., & Durnan, D. (2007). The political economy of adult education and development. In D. Kingsbury & M. Leach (Eds.), *East Timor. Beyond independence* (pp. 209-222). Clayton: Monash University Press.
- Cabral, E., & Martin-Jones, M. (2008). Writing the Resistance: Literacy in East Timor 1975-1999. *International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism*, 11(2), 149-169.
- Crowther, J., Galloway, V., & Martin, I. (Eds.). (2005). *Popular Education: Engaging the Academy*. Leicester: NIACE.
- Durnan, D. (2005). *Popular Education and Peacebuilding in Timor Leste*. Unpublished Masters of Professional Studies (Honours), University of New England, Armidale.
- Guterres, J. (Ed.). (2004). *Proceedings of the First National Literacy Conference in Timor Leste*. Dili: RDTL Ministry of Education & Oxfam.
- Hickling-Hudson, A. (2004). South-South collaboration: Cuban teachers in Jamaica and Namibia. *Comparative Education*, Vol.40 (No 2. May).
- Hill, H. (2002). *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor: Fretilin 1974-1978: The origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement*. Otford (Sydney): Otford Press.
- Leiner, M. (1987). The 1961 National Cuban Literacy Campaign. In R. F. Arnove & H. J. Graff (Eds.), *National Literacy Campaigns. Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (pp. 173-196). New York & London: Plenum Press.
- Lind, A., Askoorool, N., & Heinsohn, N. (2006). *Cuba's Global Literacy Approach "Yo, Si Puedo"* (Unpublished draft report commissioned by UNESCO, copy provided by authors).
- Lind, A. (2008). *Literacy For All. Making A Difference*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Oxfam Great Britain. (2003). *National Conference on Education Timor-Leste April 2003*, Dili.