

**PARTICIPATORY CITIZENSHIP AND SUSTAINABLE  
DEVELOPMENT: REDEFINING “PUBLIC” IN CONTEMPORARY  
CHINA AND JAPAN<sup>1</sup>**

Hongyan Gu<sup>2</sup>

The University of Sydney

Gu.hongyan@yahoo.com.cn

China's ecological future is a global concern. The concern intensifies simultaneously with China's economic volume approaching the world's first-class economies. Will China keep its development on track without being derailed by the environmental woes? This paper examines the joint efforts of state and society in meeting such challenges. Different from previous studies emphasising either institutional reform or environmental movements, this study looks at changes taking place in the space between state and society. Drawing on the Nu River controversy, the paper attempts to delineate the contours of an emerging “green” public sphere in China. It also attempts to extend the findings to the discussion on the “Asian century”. Towards this end, a brief comparison with Japan is included at the end of the paper.

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper was presented to the 17<sup>th</sup> Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia in Melbourne 1-3 July 2008. It has been peer reviewed via a double blind referee process and appears on the Conference Proceedings Website by the permission of the author who retains copyright. This paper may be downloaded for fair use under the Copyright Act (1954), its later amendments and other relevant legislation.

<sup>2</sup> The author wishes to thank the Japan Foundation for generously sponsoring part of the field research through its Doctoral Fellowship Program. All Chinese and Japanese names in this paper are in their original order with surnames appearing first.


### **The Nu River dam controversy**

The Nu River (see map 1), also known as the Salween River in the downstream countries of Burma and Thailand, is arguably one of the last two untapped rivers in China (the other is Yarlung Zangbo River in Tibet) and the longest free-flowing river in mainland Southeast Asia. It rises in northern Tibet and flows through deep gorges and canyons in south-western Yunnan province, one of China's poorest hinterlands mainly inhabited by ethnic minorities. Unlike the fate of other major rivers in China, the Nu River has been long kept away from commercial uses due to its formidable geographical landscape. However this tranquillity was breached by the revelation of a vast dam proposal in June 2003, ironically at a time when the river was enlisted into the Three Parallel Rivers World Heritage by UNESCO. Subsequently, a nation-wide anti-dam campaign was launched, which successfully solicited a suspension order from Premier Wen Jiabao in February 2004. Wen called for "prudent planning" and "scientific decision-making" for such high-profile environmentally controversial mega-projects. Having gained political endorsement from the state leader, the campaigners urged the authorities to publicly disclose the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report before making any final decision. This is the first time that EIA has been brought into the realm of public discourse following the enactment of EIA law in 2002. The "Nu River" has since then become a buzzword in the public discussion on China's hydropower development. The controversy over its EIA issues has also developed into a wider debate on how to establish scientific and democratic decision-making mechanisms for government-sponsored projects.

The Nu River case stands in stark contrast to the political repression experienced by opponents of the Three Gorges Dam. One wonders why the leadership has become more tolerant of dam opponents when China is suffering from growing energy shortage. According to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China's existing energy supply falls far behind demand and electricity blackouts often hit the country (see figure 1). This has become a major bottleneck in China's economic development. In order to ease power shortage, the Chinese government has been looking for ways to improve energy efficiency on one hand and increase power supply on the other. Simultaneously, the Chinese government is also under

international pressure to increase the share of cleaner energy forms into the fuel mix, which is currently dominated by coal-generated electricity (see figure 2). In order to


**Map 1: The proposed dams on the Nu (Salween) River**



Source: International Rivers Network, <http://www.im.org/programs/nujiang/maplarge.html> [retrieved on Sept 18, 2006]


fulfil its commitment, the Chinese government is actively promoting the development of renewable resources including hydropower electricity. Against this background, the Nu River dam project is most appealing to the decision-makers as it is set to outperform the Three Gorges Dam in terms of both power-generating capacity and investment return. However, the promising project has come to a halt because of the Premier's intervention. This has made the Nu River case even harder to understand.

**Figure 1: Energy consumption growth exceeds GDP growth in China**



Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, in (Peng, Wu et al. 2007), p. 16

**Figure 2: Electricity Generation in China by Type, 1994-2004**



Source: EIA International Energy Annual

### **An emerging environmental movement in China?**

The Nu River case has attracted keen attention from China observers abroad. Many see it as a shining example of how China's fledgling civil society could exert its influence on government decision-making. These studies often put environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the spotlight to discuss the new dynamics that NGOs have brought to the Chinese politics. Economy (2005) argues that NGOs play a critical role in advancing transparency, rule of law and official accountability, which constitute a significant force in pushing forward political reform in China. This is an extraordinary progress considering that China's first NGO – Friends of Nature (FON) – was only established in 1994. Within just a few years, there has been a major improvement in NGOs' advocacy capacity. China's NGOs are now better able to discuss social justice and resettlement issues compared with the late 1990s when they were primarily concerned with politically safe issues such as environmental education and biodiversity protection. But does this suggest that a Western-style environmental movement is emerging in China?

The answer will become clear through a brief comparison between the development of Western environmentalism and its younger Chinese counterpart. Beginning in the 1960s, environmentalism emerged in some of the advanced industrial societies in Europe and North America as part of the "new social movements", which raised a wide range of issues related to capitalism and modernity. Inspired in part by Rachel Carson's influential work – "Silent Spring" (1962), environmentalism "began as a critical discourse, rich in cultural resources and resonances" and it challenged "the subjugation of the natural lifeworld by the ravages of state and technology" (Szerszynski, Lash et al. 1996: 4). Environmental movements of this kind have played an important role in urging the state and industry to build inclusive institutions and adopt rigorous standards to protect the environment. In contrast, environmental protection in China is largely a top-down initiative. By the time China's NGOs began to emerge in the 1990s, state leaders had already been well aware of the costs and dangers associated with China's environmental degradation. As such, the central government has every good reason to embrace partnership with fledgling social organizations in the environmental arena. The intimate and symbiotic relationship

between the state and ENGOs has led some scholars to question whether independent environmental movements are likely to emerge in China (e.g., Stalley and Yang 2006).

This highlights the role of the Chinese state in shaping civil society. China has one of the world's strictest requirements for NGO registration. The 1998 Regulations on the Registration of Social Organizations stipulate that NGOs are able to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs only after they gain consent from their supervisory authorities. However, the presence of these institutional constraints does not suggest that China's political environment is unfavourable to ENGOs. On the contrary, the Chinese government has given greater merits to social organizations engaged in environmental protection than those dealing with politically sensitive issues such as human rights. This is because ENGOs activities such as environmental education, natural resource conservation and wildlife protection are consistent with the government environmental policies. Through ENGOs, the government is able to shift parts of its responsibilities to the society in providing public services. Thus, ENGOs have developed quickly over the past decade, opening a vibrant public space that facilitates networking among different social actors. In particular, the active involvement of media and academics in ENGOs activities has greatly enhanced ENGOs' capacity in dealing with complex social issues such as environmental justice and good governance. The Green Earth Volunteers is one such well-connected ENGO. It is made up of journalists, scientific experts, government officials, teachers and other professionals. Its founder, Wang Yongchen, is a veteran reporter from China National Radio. She has won several prestigious awards for her dedicated efforts in raising the profile of environmental issues among the public. Wang notes that

“The scope of ENGOs activities is changing. ENGOs used to be associated with the stereotyped image of planting trees, watching birds and picking up rubbish. Now some ENGOs have started to focus on the (government) decision-making process. In some of our earlier efforts, we pressed for protection of the ecological interests (as important as human interests). In recent years, we are more concerned about local communities whose interests are impaired by large-scale projects such as dam-building.”<sup>3</sup>

Wang brings up the issue of environmental justice associated with inequitable distribution of environmental burdens in the shadow of China's economic boom. The

---

<sup>3</sup> Personal Interview, Green Earth Volunteers office, Beijing, August 14, 2007

issue does not simply deal with how human society should co-exist with the environment, a topic commonly addressed for educational purposes. Environmental justice is a matter of politics that touches upon the underlying power structure and decision-making process of a particular society. It involves conflicting objectives and contending interests. Due to the contentious nature of environmental justice issues, most of China's ENGOs have not yet stepped into the new political frontier (Fu 2004: 430). Rather, they prefer to retain a cosy relationship with the government. The 2006 China ENGOs Development Bluebook suggests that 65 percent of ENGOs seek to cooperate with the government, 32 percent stay neutral whereas only 3 percent have certain tensions in the relationship.

According to All-China Environmental Federation, the current ENGOs-government relations are functioning well in accordance with the following principles: "to assist without causing extra trouble, to participate without overriding the authority, to monitor without replacing state's role, and to do good deeds without breaking the laws"<sup>4</sup>. These guidelines clarify the acceptable boundaries of ENGOs activities by encouraging collaboration while deterring confrontation. This moderate approach also broadens the range of roles ENGOs can play in public life. The Bluebook summarises five categories of ENGOs activities that represent the most recent advancement in the ENGO sector. They include environmental education, biodiversity protection, policy advocacy, poverty reduction and environmental litigation. The expansion of acceptable activities indicates that ENGOs have gained wider recognition through making positive contributions to government's goals. At the same time, some ENGOs are also keen on taking more responsibilities to act as environmental watchdog on behalf of the public. The campaign against damming the Nu River highlights these efforts to push the boundaries of advocacy. ENGOs such as the Green Earth Volunteers and FON have played a particularly important role in this respect.

Nevertheless, despite the progress ENGOs have made so far, the political space available for their activities is still subject to change at the discretion of the state. The difference is that political repression is no longer the only form of control. The Chinese government now allows certain degree of environmental activism as long as

---

<sup>4</sup> "China ENGOs Development Bluebook", edited by All-China Environmental Federation, published on April 22, 2006

it operates within the law and does not contradict the ideas of national unity and state order. This has become a tacit agreement between the state and ENGOs. SEPA's deputy director Pan Yue has repeatedly called ENGOs "natural allies" (*tianran mengyou*) in the country's battle against environmental destruction<sup>5</sup>. But this does not mean that ENGOs are in equal relationship with the government. As FON's former director Liang Congjie said, "we have done our best to influence the government, but it is the government that has the final say"<sup>6</sup>. Similarly, Yu Xiaogang, director of the Green Watershed, told the media that "it's not about inciting people to confront the government as a mob. We hope to open dialogue channels to let ordinary people protect their rights rationally"<sup>7</sup>. Yu's ENGO is based in Yunnan and he was actively involved in the Nu River campaign. In 2006, Yu was awarded Goldman Environmental Prize for his outstanding contribution to community empowerment in China's dam-affected areas. Despite his international recognition, Yu's good deeds were not always rewarded. The Yunnan government once labelled Yu as a "trouble maker" and his ENGO as an "extremist organization"<sup>8</sup>. The tension peaked in the second half of 2004 when Green Watershed was threatened to shut down as its engagement with resettlement issues displeased the local authorities<sup>9</sup>. Although the situation has improved since then, the Yunnan government still keeps Green Watershed under close watch. The ebbs and flows of state-ENGOs relations suggest that China's green space can be both conducive and restrictive. For survival and legitimacy in the semi-authoritarian milieu, environmental activism has to become structurally embedded through "self-imposed censorship" and "conscious depoliticization of environmental politics" (Ho 2007: 189). This is the fundamental difference between Chinese environmentalism and its Western counterpart.

---

<sup>5</sup> Personal interview, Green Earth Volunteers office, Beijing, August 14, 2007

<sup>6</sup> M. Taufiqurrahman, "Environmental NGOs make progress in China", The Jakarta Post, 4 October 2005, retrieved through Factiva on Dec 8, 2006

<sup>7</sup> The Standard, "Still, he refuses to scale down his environmental campaigns and, in a sign of...", 16 April 2005, retrieved through Factiva on Dec 8, 2006

<sup>8</sup> The Standard, "Still, he refuses to scale down his environmental campaigns and, in a sign of...", 16 April 2005, retrieved through Factiva on Dec 8, 2006

<sup>9</sup> "Respite for Yunnan anti-dam NGO as movement mourns loss for key activist", Fu Tao, China Development Brief, 21 Jan 2005 <http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/104> [retrieved on Sept 17, 2007]

### **The development of a state-sponsored public sphere**

As is evident, ENGOs have been growing in a space designed by the party-state. Such a space does not have a larger autonomy than the one that emerged in the 1980s and the scope of its action is less politically inclined than before (Beja 2006: 62). This is because ENGOs have developed at a time when China has experienced the least fractious leadership transition and the Party has become increasingly secularised (FitzGerald, Davies et al. 2005: 19-20). The trend is particularly pronounced in the Hu-Wen government (2003-now). Through promoting the concepts of “scientific development” and “harmonious society”, the fourth generation leadership attempt to leave behind the “baggage of revolutionary romanticism, fantasy and dogma” and float China “off into the modern world, with its first ever modern government” (*ibid*: 20). At the heart of this new political agenda is “good governance” by which political issues are increasingly framed in policy terms and government legitimacy is more staked on administrative competence. Through adopting populism, the Hu-Wen government has attached greater importance to social development and the party-state has demonstrated a remarkable capability to adapt to the new themes of governance: consultation of public service users, recourse to experts and the increasing roles of a civil society (Beja 2006: 71). By speaking globalized languages, the Chinese government sounds no less responsive than those in the liberal democracies. This has led some China scholars to cast doubt on the view that Chinese politics is getting stagnant despite three decades of economic reform (e.g., Gilboy and Read 2008).

Indeed, China is by no means a democracy yet. The purposeful deployment of citizen-related terms in public discourse has more to do with educating people in the workings of the market and the rule of law other than introducing democratic changes (Keane 2001:3). Through promoting the idea of citizenship and legal rights, the Chinese government is able to reformulate “the collective sense of ‘the people’ into the individualised sense of the law-abiding, rights-possessing, rational, consuming individual” (Keane 2001:10). This distinguishes Chinese citizenship from that prevailing in the Western liberal democracies. Instead of asserting political rights and individual freedom, Chinese citizenship is “embedded within an authoritarian mode of governance and a collectivist understanding of rights” (Keane 2001:3). Rights emanating from Chinese citizenship obligate individuals to participate in nation

building and the statist notion of citizenship has a long standing tradition that can be traced back to the late Qing and the Republican periods (Goldman 2005: 10). As such, the increasing visibility of civic participation in contemporary China's policy process may not well support the view that China is undergoing political pluralisation<sup>10</sup>. Rather, through depoliticization of environmental politics, contentious environmental issues have been gradually transformed into social problems, and they are more likely to be addressed from a public policy perspective. This is what exactly happened to the Nu River controversy. In December 2007, candidates sitting for the national public servant recruitment examinations were required to discuss the pros and cons of damming the Nu River (Hu and Yang 2008: 16). The cooptation of public opinions reflects state efforts in moulding China's own version of a public sphere that features "a state presence, a degree of autonomous or voluntary social involvement, some social impact on policy, and a legitimising idea of the common good" (Rankin 1993: 160). Nevertheless, no matter how unique the Chinese politics might be, China's struggle for sustainable development is reminiscent of the Japanese experience in many ways. An inclusion of Japan in the discussion will help better assess the validity of the "Asian century" claim.

### **A comparison with Japan**

Japan was a prototype of the developmental state. However, the much-celebrated Japanese model has proven to be more adept at catch-up than self-sustaining. Since the late 1980s, Japan's remarkable success in the post-war era has turned out to be illusory, which culminated in the bursting of the Japanese asset price bubble in the early 1990s. Studies such as McCormack (1996) and Kerr (2001) reveal the fragile foundations of Japan's prosperity that were politically corrupt, financially indebted and ecologically destructive. The fall of the Japanese model was accompanied by a widespread sentiment of "Japan passing" in contrast to "Japan bashing" of the 1980s

---

<sup>10</sup> In his book *China's Water Warriors* (2008), Mertha examines recent dam controversies in Southwest China including the proposed Nu River dam. He argues that occasional success of environmental activism signals a marked change in the Chinese politics. But this does not lead him to suggest China's transition to democracy. Instead, Mertha (2008: 151) concludes that political pluralisation is a more viable paradigm to explain China's political process.

provoked by the fear of Japan's formidable rise<sup>11</sup>. At the turn of the twentieth century, Japan stumbled over the turbulence of its modernity and was desperately in search of a new identity and a sense of direction.

As the postwar consensus on the primacy of economic growth no longer holds, Japan needs to reinvent its social compact (Pekkanen 2004: 382). Like its Chinese counterpart, the Japanese government has placed an increasing emphasis on citizenship in contrast to the collective sense of "nationals" (*kokumin*). The 1994 Cabinet Office report appeals that

"Every individual should be aware of their responsibilities to support the nation and localities. Such civic awareness can be stimulated and inspired through participation in various social activities. In this sense, social participation plays an important role in creating a virtuous cycle of civil society that is built on self-consciousness and self-responsibility."<sup>12</sup>

A more recent Cabinet report further develops the idea of citizenship. The 2004 White Paper on National Lifestyle argues that when people with similar concerns over a particular issue spontaneously build their network and take concerted action, a new form of "public" will emerge.<sup>13</sup>

Nevertheless, Japan's transition towards citizen-oriented governance is still in a trial-and-error stage. The controversy surrounding the planning of the 2005 Aichi Expo epitomizes such a learning process. The plan to bid for the World Expo 2005 was conceived after the city of Nagoya was defeated by Seoul to host the 1988 Olympics. Located in central Japan, Aichi prefecture was economically reliant on its sophisticated car industry boasting production of the household brand Toyota. However, its manufacturing strength was no longer a positive asset in the information age and the structural problem worsened during Japan's economic recession. As such, the governor of Aichi intended to use the Expo as a potent stimulus to gear the regional economy towards a new direction. The idea was well reflected in the initial

---

<sup>11</sup> The series of media buzzwords such as "Japan bashing", "Japan passing" and "Japan forgetting" reflect Japan's ups and downs in the global political economic focus over the past three decades. In particular, they depict the centrality of American influence in the worldviews upon Japan.

<sup>12</sup> The report is entitled of "The 14<sup>th</sup> Quality of Life Policy Council, the Committee on Citizen Consciousness and Social Participation Report", available at Japan Cabinet website [http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/shingikai/kokuseishin/spc\\_top.html](http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/shingikai/kokuseishin/spc_top.html) [retrieved on Jan 17, 2008]

<sup>13</sup> The subtitle of the 2004 National White Paper on National Lifestyle is self-instructive: "Connections between individuals improve life and localities – the path to a new 'public'". [http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/whitepaper/h16/01\\_honpen/](http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/whitepaper/h16/01_honpen/) [retrieved on Jan 17, 2008]

proposal themed as “Technology, Culture, and Communication – Creating a New Globe”. The emphasis on developmentalism was strongly criticised for the lack of a broader vision in hosting a Universal Exposition. At the time of planning, sustainable development had just come atop on the global agenda and the environment was expected to be a major theme for the first World Expo to be held in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In fact, one of the rival candidate cities – Calgary, Canada – had already incorporated sustainable development into its proposal.

In order to win hearts and minds, a national steering committee changed the theme to “Beyond Development – Rediscovering Nature’s Wisdom”, which played an important role in securing the bid in 1997. However, the government’s actions contradicted its rhetoric. The original plan designated 250 hectares of land in the Kaisho Forest as the main construction venue site, which encroached on the ever-disappearing rural landscape known as *Satoyama*. *Satoyama* contains a mosaic of forests, rice paddy fields and small reservoirs and it symbolizes sustainable living in Japanese tradition. During the 1980s and 1990s, *Satoyama* conservation movement developed quickly across the country as more and more Japanese citizens came to realize its importance in the maintenance of healthy ecosystems. Located in the eastern part of Aichi, the Kaisho Forest is one of the few remaining *Satoyamas* and is home to 27 endangered species (Matsuda, Serizawa et al. 2003). The potential environmental destruction by an undesired mega-project provoked local resistance and the environmental campaign soon gathered momentum. In 1999, following the discovery of nearly extinct goshawks by an ENGO - Japan Wild Birds Society, the conflict escalated. Dissatisfied with the government’s response, the environmental groups sent petitions directly to the Bureau of International Expositions (BIE). A former senior environmental official also used his connection with World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF) to pressurize BIE. In order to save Aichi Expo as well as itself, the BIE arranged an immediate inspection of the site and strongly criticized the Japanese government. In particular, it urged the organizer to alter construction plans in consultation with environmental groups.

In March 2000, a roundtable was initiated in order to solve the conflicts between government officials and environmental groups. The roundtable negotiation was considered cutting-edge in Japan’s environmental politics as public involvement in

government decision-making was unprecedented. After eight rounds of negotiation, a final agreement was reached, which significantly reduced the land use area in the Kaisho Forest to 10 hectares. This set up a good example for similar events and accordingly citizen participation was established as an integral theme for the Aichi Expo. However, it may be too early to be optimistic. As Tanioka Kuniko (chairwoman of the roundtable) points out, citizen participation was “three steps forward, two steps backward” (Tanioka 2005). The regression is due to the resilience of bureaucratic elites’ old system that constrains the development of new partnership between the state and society. Furthermore, public involvement alone cannot alter the Aichi Expo towards a more eco-friendly direction. Global car giant Toyota has played a key role behind the scenes in bringing about change in government attitudes (Yoshimi 2005: 277). All of these indicate that Japan’s transition towards citizen-oriented culture is bound to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

Although much remains unsolved, through hosting the Aichi Expo the Japanese government is able to re-brand itself as a global environmental leader and embark on a new era for sustainable development. Two following events deserve special mention here. In 2007, the Cabinet approved the proposal to have the environment as the major pillar for Japan’s nation-building strategy<sup>14</sup>. By incorporating traditional wisdom of *Satoyama*, the Japanese government aims to build its own model of sustainability and promote it globally. In May 2008, the city of Nagoya won another bid to host the 10<sup>th</sup> United Nations Biodiversity Conference. *Satoyama* again became the focal point in Japan’s appeal for environmental leadership. By reclaiming its own traditional values, Japan seems to start moving beyond the trap of modernity and step onto a path less travelled.

### **Conclusion: Asian century of its own making**

The speculation on an Asian century is based on the demographic and economic trends that have proven to be unsustainable. In fact, the very idea of “Asian century” is deeply rooted in a catch-up mentality with the modern West as a universal model to

---

<sup>14</sup> On 1 June 2007, the Cabinet approved the “the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Environment-oriented Nation Building Strategy”. It aims to build a Japanese model of sustainable development and promote Japan’s global leadership. It also emphasizes collaboration among government, industry and NGOs. Relevant documents are available at [http://www.env.go.jp/guide/info/21c\\_ens/index.html](http://www.env.go.jp/guide/info/21c_ens/index.html) [retrieved on Dec 3, 2007]

follow. However, the model has been found problematic. Thus, a new social compact is needed to help sustain Asia's long-term growth. The paper has surveyed the latest trends in Asia's two largest economies - China and Japan with a focus on the former. Although China and Japan are in different developmental stages, they have demonstrated converging political tendencies. Both countries have incorporated participatory citizenship into their new nation-building strategy, namely sustainable development. As the case studies suggest, a public sphere has emerged during this process albeit along a different trajectory comparing with the West. Simultaneously, the state is also undergoing self-transformation in a rapidly changing world. It remains to be seen how the various experiments can help shape a sustainable future. But one thing is certain. Without a ready-made model to follow, Asians are making their own history in the 21st century and the journey has just begun.

## Bibliography

Beja, J.-P. (2006). "The changing aspects of civil society in China." Social Research **73**(1): 53-74.

Carson, R. (1962). Silent spring. London, Hamish Hamilton.

Economy, E. (2005). China's environmental movement. Testimony before the congressional executive commission on China roundtable on Environmental NGOs in China: encouraging action and addressing public grievances. Rayburn house office building, Washington DC.

FitzGerald, S., I. Davies, et al. (2005). China 2001-2010: political, economic and social issues of reform and transformation (submitted for AusAid project). Sydney, NewSouth Global.

Fu, T. (2004). Zhongguo de huanjing NGO: zai canyu zhong chengzhang (China's green NGOs: growing in participation). Zhongguo huanjing yu fazhan pinglun (China environment and development review: No.2). Y. Zheng. Beijing, Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House: 416-454.

Gilboy, G. J. and B. L. Read (2008). "Political and social reform in China: alive and walking." The Washington Quarterly **31**(3): 143-164.

Goldman, M. (2005). From comrade to citizen: the struggle for political rights in China. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

Ho, P. (2007). "Embedded activism and political change in a semiauthoritarian context." China information **XXI**(2): 187-209.

Hu, K. and D. Yang (2008). Zhongguo de lvse changzheng: zai weiwei yu zhuanji zhong qianxing (The long march of green in China: proceeding among crisis and opportunities). Zhongguo huanjing de weiwei yu zhuanji (The crisis and opportunities of China's environment). D. Yang. Beijing, Social sciences academic press (China): 1-23.

Keane, M. (2001). "Redefining Chinese citizenship." Economy and Society **30**(1): 1-17.

Kerr, A. (2001). Dogs and Demons: the Fall of Modern Japan. London, Penguin.

Matsuda, H., S. Serizawa, et al. (2003). "Assessing the impact of the Japanese 2005 World Exposition project on vascular plants' risk of extinction." Chemosphere **53**: 325-336.

McCormack, G. (1996). The emptiness of Japanese affluence. St Leonards, N.S.W. , Allen & Unwin.

Mertha, A. C. (2008). China's water warriors: citizen action and policy change. Ithaca & London, Cornell University Press.

Pekkanen, R. (2004). "After the developmental state: civil society in Japan." Journal of East Asian Studies 4: 363-388.

Peng, Z., Y. Wu, et al. (2007). "Nengyuan xiaohao yu GDP zengzhang (Energy consumption and GDP growth)." Zhongguo tongji (China Statistics) 7: 16-18.

Rankin, M. B. (1993). "Some observations on a Chinese public sphere." Modern China 19(2): 158-182.

Stalley, P. and D. Yang (2006). "An emerging environmental movement in China? ." China Quarterly 186: 333-356.

Szerszynski, B., S. Lash, et al. (1996). Introduction: ecology, realism and the social sciences. Risk, environment and modernity: towards a new ecology. S. Lash, B. Szerszynski and B. Wynne. London, Sage: 1-26.

Tanioka, I. (2005). Sanpo susunde, nipo sagatta shimin sanko (Citizen participation: three steps forward, two steps backward). Shimin Sankagata Shakai toha - Aichi Banpaku keikaku katei to kokyoken no saisouzou (What is a Citizen participation society? the planning process of Aichi Expo and the recreation of public sphere). T. Machimura and S. Yoshimi. Tokyo, Yuhikaku: 211-228.

Yoshimi, S. (2005). Banpaku Gensou-sengo seiji no jubaku (The illusions about Expo: the spellful binding of the post-war politics). Tokyo, Chikuma Book House.