Kargil: The planned Misadventure
by Brigadier Shaheedul Anam Khan
If a military venture is meant to attain a country's political objective then there is reason to question Pakistan's success in this regard in the Kargil venture. Pakistan's Kargil operation is another specimen of a botched plan, which failed to foresee the diplomatic price that Pakistan has had to pay in implementing it.
If the aim was to internationalise the Kashmir issue and bring India to the discussion table then success on that count has been at best marginal. India as it is, had accepted to include Kashmir in the agenda for their secretary level talks. Now that India has set three preconditions for any future talks with Pakistan, which include Pakistan ceasing its support to the Kashmiri Mujahedeens, the prospect of a solution of the issue is even more distant than ever before.
Pakistan's claim that her support to the Mujahedeens was restricted to only political and psychological support has been disproved by the events in Kargil. No guerrilla group could undertake such a military venture without the active support and participation of a third country/ party. In fact the whole episode was a military blunder since it went against the teachings of guerrilla/ insurgency warfare. Holding of ground or features cannot be the objective of a guerrilla group unless it can achieve that level of tactical military equality that allows them to embark in open encounter with the opposing military forces. Reports do not suggest that the Kashmiri Mujahedeens had indeed that level of military strength to indulge in open hostility with the Indian regular forces. The Pakistani COAS has himself admitted to his regular troops undertaking 'recce in force' across the LoC.
It is very difficult for one to accept the premise that Pakistan had undertaken the Kargil operation to solve the Kashmir problem. I do not think that even the Pakistanis had this in mind either. What did it gain for Pakistan then? That the big powers are talking of a solution of the Kashmir issue albeit through bilateral talks has, for the Pakistanis, become an achievement worth the venture.
To my mind there were three compulsions that forced Pakistan into this venture. First, the fact that the Kashmiri Insurgency was on the wane and the prospect of the issue slipping out from international reckoning was very strong. The Pakistani leadership felt the need to urgently bring the issue out of the doldrums to prevent it from totally waning. Coupled with this was the fact that pressure was brought to bear on Pakistan's leadership both internally and externally, from interested quarters, to resuscitate the Kashmir issue and bring it on the international agenda. The third compulsion was to test the response of India, both political and military, to see how far she was willing to go in restoring the integrity of the LoC.
Violations of the LoC is a stratagem which both India and Pakistan resort to from time to time. Pakistan's strategic perception notwithstanding, the reason why she suffered diplomatically was the timing of the operation. While Pakistan thought it opportune to launch a military offensive at a time of political uncertainty in India, to the rest of the world Pakistan's credentials were damaged by the fact that the Kargil episode followed on the heels of the 'Lahore Declaration'.
The Kargil incident has brought to the fore a few realities. First, there is the realisation that nuclearisation in South Asia would set up a process of unbridled weapons proliferation, particularly of conventional weapons. This view, to which I have always subscribed to, has been proven correct.
Second, there is the apprehension that the recently acquired nuclear strength would be flaunted as a weapon to coerce a recalcitrant neighbour without actually going so far as to use it. This is clearly evident from the Kargil episode.
Third, while at the local level one cannot rule out the possibility of recrudescence of Kargil elsewhere, the compulsions of both India and Pakistan to maintain strategic stability in the region are many. Reports indicate that India and Pakistan were at the verge of a wider conflagration, with India almost at the point of opening a second front. That India desisted from actually going for other options can be attributed to the nuclear factor.
Finally, one can expect resurgence of insurgency activities in Indian Kashmir following the Kargil catastrophe.
About the Author
Brigadier Shaheedul Anam Khan, Commissioned in the army in 1968. Attended the Army Staff Course,Camberley, UK 1979, and the National Defence College, New Delhi,1988. Awarded 'Masters in Defence Studies' from NDC, New Delhi. Brig Khan has attended number of international Seminars, Conference and Symposia on Security including the 'Second Round of Dialogue on "Security in Asia"' organised by Monash University. Brig Khan has authored several articles for Seminars and International Journals including,"Security of Bangladesh in the 21st Century." " Nuclearisation of South Asia :Concerns of Non-nuclear States.""Security, Defence and Development." "Nuclearisation of South Asia: A view from Bangladesh." Brig Khan has been in his present appointment as Director General of the Bangladesh Institute for International and Strategic Studies since Feb 1997.