Are Pakistan and India on a Warpath?
By Abdul Sattar
Tension once again grips Pakistan-India relations. Once again the Kashmir fuse is burning. India is giving diplomacy no chance. It has presented Pakistan with demands. �Or else� is implicit in its rejection of further talks. Might an apparently local crisis escalate? Can war clouds be dispelled? Will the world community play a salutary role?
I- Kargil crisis
The cauldron in Kashmir has boiled over once again. The ostensible
cause is Kargil. India has accused Pakistan of masterminding the
local conflict just as it labelled the freedom movement in Kashmir
as Pakistani in inspiration, It has intensified military operations
in the sector, inducted tens of thousands of soldiers and heavy armour
and, for the first time since 1971, brought air force into action
to bomb freedom fighters it variously dubs as �Islamic militants�,�infiltrators�
or �Pakistan army personnel�.
India has not only bombed the Kargil heights on the Indian side of the line of control; its spokesmen now admit that Indian artillery has fired also on the Pakistan side, at what they describe as supply bases. Also, duels have raged elsewhere along the line of control. By mid-June, forty seven Pakistani soldiers were killed and fifty wounded as a result of Indian firing.
India has rebuffed Pakistani efforts for peace. New Delhi was tardy in responding to Islamabad�s offer to send the foreign minister for talks with Indian leaders. The sole exception to the vituperative rhetoric from New Delhi was the statement of the Indian prime minister. Atal Behari Vajpayee said on June 9 that �Both countries will be able to find a way of defusing tensions.� That note of moderation was welcomed by proponents of peace in Pakistan and the world over. It was however soon drowned out by jingoistic noises.
After reluctantly agreeing to Pakistan foreign minister�s visit on June 12, New Delhi accorded to him a frosty reception. according to well informed reports the Indian external affairs minister was stern and peremptory in the talks. Briefing the press, Jaswant Singh used the word �demand� three times in one minute. Evidently, India wants to dictate preconceived terms. The door to further talks has been slammed shut. New Delhi does not want to give bilateral diplomacy a chance.
Instead, Indian diplomacy has concentrated its efforts on isolating Pakistan internationally. To that end, Jaswant Singh went to Beijing. He pleaded that India does not consider China a threat to its security. Expediency was obvious in his strained effort to go back on the statements of not only his defence minister who last year called China as �Threat No. 1� but also his prime minister who wrote letters to the president of the United States and leaders of other important countries justifying nuclear explosions because of the threat from China.
Also, meanwhile India has mounted efforts to push Pakistan into a corner of isolation. To that end it has projected the Kargil crisis as the result of Pakistani provocation and fostered the impression that the cause of the current tension is local as well as recent. Few observers seem to know that the reality is exactly the opposite.
For years India has been committing incursions and occupying territory previously under Pakistani control. The most glaring of these violations was Indian penetration in Siachen where neither the 1949 Cease-fire Line nor the 1972 line of control was delineated. Taking advantage of the ambiguity India used its capability for mountain warfare, built up for operations on the boundary with China, to occupy a large part of the glaciated area in 1984.
Even where the old or the new cease-fire line has been delineated, India has been nibbling at territory on the Pakistan side of the undemarcated line. In doing so, it has demonstrated contempt for recognised international norms which prohibit violations of an agreed truce or cease-fire. It has also ignored the Simla agreement of 1972 which provided that �Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation.�
Having taken adverse possession of territory in the
divided state, Indian military has refused to withdraw and Indian
diplomacy has characteristically backed the military by refusing
to allow impartial determination of facts leave alone settlement
of differences and disputes. In 1972 it sidelined UNMOGIP which can
no longer perform its responsibilities effectively.
II
- Indian Motives
Seen in perspective,
the events in the Kargil area are not isolated but part of a discernible
design: India is pursuing a preconceived plan to create an empty
belt of scorched earth between occupied Kashmir and the rest of the
state. And this plan is part of a policy calculated to stifle the
Kashmiri struggle and consolidate the temporary line of control and
turn it into a permanent line of partition.
Ever
since the Kashmiri people rose in struggle for freedom, Indian forces
have resorted to a brutal policy of repression in India-held Kashmir
as well as to recurrent artillery and mortar fire across the line
of control. Pakistani military posts have replied in kind but the
civilian population in Azad Kashmir has suffered. The Indian campaign
was intensified following the BJP�s rise to power in 1998 and
promulgation of a �proactive� policy by the Indian home
minister, Lal Krishna Advani. The Neelum Valley road and the villages
around were subjected to fierce artillery bombardment, and thousands
of people
were forced to flee their homes. Last month
again, dozens of civilians including school children fell victim
to lethal shelling from the Indian side.
Indian
escalation in the Kargil area is partly explicable in the context
of the exposure of its false claim of success in pacification
in Kashmir. Although over half a million Indian armed men equipped
with heavy arms have made brutal use of firepower, killed tens of
thousands of Kashmiris and committed atrocities against men, women
and children, the Kashmiri people have remained firm in their resolve
to win freedom. The reign of terror has predictably failed in its
inhuman and immoral mission to suppress and stifle the Kashmiri struggle.
On the contrary, the freedom movement has become more determined
as brutal Indian repression has illustrated the colonial nature of
alien occupation. Political and peaceful at the start, it has been
obliged
to turn militant, with freedom fighters choosing
place and time more suitable for resistance and the demonstration
of resolve to liberate their homeland.
III
- Prospects
To be of interest or worth,
analysis as to prospects for peace must proceed from known facts,
policies and approaches. Firstly, ever since 1947, New Delhi has
sought to exploit power disparity to impose its own perverse solutions
in respect of differences and disputes with Pakistan. It has insisted
on exclusively bilateral talks because in the absence of third parties
it can press its demands and arm-twist the weaker party without embarrassment
or shame. No wonder that bilateral negotiations between Pakistan
and India have seldom resolved mutual difference. At Simla Indian
diplomacy gloried in use of duress for a diktat.
No wonder, too, that India has sought to exclude other peaceful means for settlement of disputes which are enumerated in Article 33 of the UN Charter and recognised by the civilised community of states. India resists and rejects these means even though - actually because - their use led to lawful settlement of two important issues: the Indus Waters dispute through the good offices of the World Bank and the Rann of Kutch boundary through international arbitration.
Secondly, India relishes negotiating from a position of strength. It first tries to forces a favourable position on the ground and then offers talks but not genuine negotiations. The latter involve give and take but in its dealings with Pakistan New Delhi presents its preferences on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
In the wake of the Kargil crisis, New Delhi�s emphasis
has been once again on a military solution. Pakistan�s desire
for peaceful
settlement was not reciprocated. The sole
exception to the vituperative rhetoric from New Delhi was the statement
of Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee who was quoted
to have said on June 9 that �Both countries will be able to
find a way of defusing tensions.�That note of moderation was
welcomed by proponents of peace in Pakistan and the world over. It
was however soon drowned out by jingoistic noises.
After presenting the Pakistani foreign minister with what sounded like an ultimatum, Indian has slammed shut the door to further talks. President Clinton�s pleadings do not appear to have moved Prime Minister Vajpayee to resume talks with Pakistan. New Delhi does not want to give diplomacy a chance.
Indian military has seldom demonstrated restraint in the execution of their purpose when they believe the balance of power is in their favour. Besides, lessons of history are disturbing. Cascading events have a dynamics of their own. Disproportionate reactions to limited actions can become links in a chain of escalation leading to a war that neither side originally planned.. Nor does overt nuclearisation constitute a guarantee against escalation.
No doubt, nuclear weapons strengthen the logic of restraint. The prime ministers of Pakistan and India acknowledged in their February 12, 1999 statement that the nuclear environment adds to their responsibility to prevent conflict between the two countries. But that cannot be taken for granted. The current chief of staff the Indian army, General V. P. Malik has said that �the possibility of a conventional war cannot be ruled out simply because India had crossed the nuclearthreshold.� If militancy in India-held Kashmir "grows too much", he added, India could contemplate a conventional war. (The ASIAN AGE, New Delhi, Feb. 11, 1999)
India-watchers observe
the portents with alarm and apprehension. Reports about forward deployment
of Indian forces add menace to the rapidly deteriorating situation.
Adventurism remains a possibility so long as tensions remain high.
Enlargement of areas of conflict cannot therefore be excluded. If
Indian military staff become impatient in pursuit of their narrow
objective in Kargil, they could unleash forces in other sectors within
Kashmir, along the working boundary between Pakistan and India-held
Kashmir or even across the international boundary.
IV
- World Community
Turning to the role
of the world community, it would be self-defeating to assume that
the permanent members of the UN Security Council are biased against
Pakistan. Council resolution 1172 of June 6, 1998 was quite even-handed
even if it was not entirely acceptable. It was eminently right in
recognising that that the removal of tensions between India and Pakistan
requires resolution of the root causes, including Kashmir. Only it
failed to follow the logic of its own diagnosis. Instead of contributing
to the resolution of the dispute in a meaningful way, it called upon
the two countries to resume dialogue oblivious to the fact that the
two countries have held negotiations for decades but without salutary
result.
Mere words by the Security Council urging the two countries to resume dialogue was an ostrich-like evasion of reality and an abdication of the Council�s duty as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 24 entrusts the Security Council with �primary responsibility� for the maintenance of international peace and security and vests it with specific powers for the discharge of this responsibility. But the Council has deemed it politic to shun and ignore its duty.
Manifest contradictions and inconsistencies of foreign powers cannot however absolve our own government of its errors of omission and commission. We could and should have utilised the anniversary resolution 1172 on June 6 to remind the Council of the failure of India and Pakistan to even begin a substantive dialogue on the root causes of tensions, especially Kashmir.
The Nawaz Sharif government
allowed domestic propaganda priorities to build up artificial euphoria
over �Bus Diplomacy� and the so-called achievements of
the February 12 meeting of the prime ministers of Pakistan and India
on February 12. The former stands exposed as a childish stunt, and
the Lahore Declaration as a pompous document with empty promises.
It is apparent now that it was an exercise in self-deception. Worse,
it provided an alibi to the Security Council. Already reluctant because
of Indian opposition to fulfil its Charter responsibility to act
for the maintenance of peace and security in South Asia, the Council
gladly joined us in celebrating our achievement. Can we now turn
to the Council and admit we failed to understand Indian policy, intentions
and manoeuvres?
V - Averting War
Failure to recognise and highlight the sterile nature of the
Pakistan-India dialogue (Talks over 30 years have failed to resolved
the relatively minor issue of the boundary in Sir Creek, to the detriment
of fishermen of both countries scores of whom get incarcetrated when
caught in waters claimed by the other side!) and keep influential
powers informed about Indian violations of the line of control have
contributed to their distorted perception. Already lobbies with vested
interests resisted due notice of India�s brutal repression of
the Kashmiri freedom struggle. Today too many Western observers view
the Kargil crisis in isolation and blame Pakistan for precipitating
it. According to agency reports, President Clinton has �encouraged�
or �urged� the Pakistan prime minister to �withdraw
his forces from the Indian zone of Kashmir.�
Such an impression on the part of one or more permanent members of the Security Council should be a cause of serious concern for Pakistan. It cannot afford to be blamed by world opinion. Power disparity places greater responsibility on Pakistan�s shoulders for efforts for preservation of peace, de-escalation of tensions and prevention of war. India has seldom missed an opportunity to exploit Pakistan�s isolation.
Desiring peace and tranquillity on the borders, with multiple domestic problems and the crisis of governance requiring priority attention, Pakistan must intensify efforts for an honourable resolution of the crisis.On this objective there can be no disagreement.
The task of Pakistan�s diplomacy is clear. Even now the government should try to highlight the background to the build up of tension along the line of control. It should publish a catalogue of Indian intrusions and violations.
More importantly, Islamabad should take initiatives
to promote transparency and restraint to contain the Kargil crisis.
It should
request the UN Secretary General to activate
UNMOGIP and invite observers to see that Pakistan is not engaged
in any provocation. Influential states should be requested to join
efforts for the stabilisation of the line of control.
The heightening of tensions triggered by the Kargil incident should serve to remind us and the world at large that Kashmir will not be at peace so long as its people are not free, and that good-neighbourly cooperation between Pakistan and India will continue to elude them so long as this root cause of tensions is not removed.
The lives lost in Kargil should remind people of goodwill to reflect on the price the two nations continue to pay in human suffering and scarce resources for failure to resolve the Kashmir question in accordance with the right and aspirations of the Kashmiri people. History is witness that a people will not acquiesce in colonial rule.
Were that to happen, Kargil might prove to be a turning point in the tortured history of South Asia.
About the Author
During career in the diplomatic service, Abdul Sattar was ambassador to Austria, India, and the former Soviet Union. As Foreign Secretary, he participated in the Geneva negotiations on Afghanistan, leading to agreement 1988 on withdrawal of Soviet forces. He was foreign minister in the caretaker cabinet in 1993. As Distinguished Fellow at the US Institute of Peace, in Washington in 1994, he wrote an article on Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia, published in Nonproliferation Review , Monterey, Californa, in Winter 1995. He contributed a chapter on foreign policy for a book, Pakistan In Perspective , editor Rafi Raza, published by.Oxford Unity Press, one the 50th anniversary of Pakistan's independence. After the nuclear tests in 1998, he written articles on emergent issues in The News , Islamabad, and was a participant in both the Melbourne Group Dialogue of August 1998 and the Washington Dialogue on February 1999. In late 1999, he came out of retirement to take up the position of Foreign Minister of Pakistan.