Sam Hoffman
Supervisor:
Thesis Topic:
Saul Kripke's dismissal of previous descriptive theories of meaning continues W. Quine's line of argument that descriptive meanings are open to revision in the light of new empirical theories. Kripke's causal theory of reference has been interpreted as promoting the view that names, demonstratives and natural kind terms are directly referential, without the mediation of descriptive meanings. I defend a descriptive theory of meaning which incorporates Kripke's causal chains of communication and allows for the retention of analyticity. Ascribing descriptive meanings to such terms avoids Putnam's need to include their extensions within their meanings, and allows for there to be a narrow content in propositional attitudes. Narrow content is understood to be supervenient on the internal state of the subject. I will then argue that there is privileged access to one's own conscious, occurrent mental states and to the narrow contents of one's propositional attitudes, such as thoughts, beliefs, justifications and desires.
I wish to defend Frege's view that, tacitly at least, meanings are held in the mind by a competent speaker in using an expression. I do not take this to be analytic about the meaning of 'meaning'. I identify the meaning of a noun with its conventional, mode of presentation, which serves as its intension from contextual indices to its referent. I am not adopting Frege's assumption that there must always be a shared, objective content of thought associated with an expression. As I will discuss further, proper names and natural kind terms can be used correctly without the user knowing their full meaning. Such uses rely on appropriating the meanings from more competent users, and I take that to be insufficient qualification for full competency in the use of those terms, even though they succeed in their reference. Similarly third person pronouns can be used anaphorically, without knowing to whom they refer. Since the context of use is involved in determining the meaning of pronouns, and the speaker is not aware of this associated context in such cases, therefore he does not qualify as competent in that particular usage. According to Kripke's causal theory of reference, any identities between natural kind terms are metaphysically necessary, even though they can only be discovered empirically. This leads him to support some form of dualism because, if the mind were identical to the brain in the actual world, then it would not be possible for the mind to exist in any other form. Since it is conceivable for pain to manifest in some other form than the actual physical process, and since we identify pain by its essential, phenomenal nature, therefore this must also be logically possible.
I argue against Kripke's de re essentialism, and therefore require that the meanings of names and natural kind terms carry a sortal categorization, which determines the conditions for identity. Such sortal identity conditions for mental states and brain states allow for contingent identity. I agree with Kripke, that the materialist view must hold that a physical description of the world is a complete description of it, and that mental facts are entailed by the physical facts. I also agree that mental states and brain states would be identified by their essential properties, and therefore, that the conceivability of realizing mental states without brain states, ensures that this is also a logical possibility. However, this does not lead me to accept David Chalmer's converse premise, in his defence of dualism, that the a priori, conceivability of the brain states occurring without mental properties, entails that this is also logically (metaphysically) possible. Fixing the references of brain states and mental states by their essential properties only ensures that we could identify them correctly, even if they were distinct. It does not ensure the possibility of zombies, having the brain state without the corresponding mental state. The corresponding brain states are not simple, static configurations, but interconnected processes, which would only be replicated under the same physical laws. If it was not nomically possible to replicate the brain state without the accompanying mental state, that would also make it metaphysically impossible.
My position is founded on a descriptive theory of meaning, which needs to be understood in the context of the debate engendered by the following major theoretical developments.
Interests
I was working on my Master's thesis part-time. Otherwise, I am a picture-framer. So if anyone wants any sort of pictures, I sell them from home at 6 Pell St, East Bentleigh. Ph. 9570 8284.