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PHL3100 Philosophical issues in applied ethics

Unit description:

If a human fetus is a potential person, what moral status does that confer on it? This is a familiar question from ethical debates about abortion. The advent of embryonic stem cell research, and the creation of human embryos through somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning, has again placed philosophical questions about the meaning and moral significance of potentiality at centre stage. Are human embryos potential persons? If an embryo created through somatic cell nuclear transfer cloning is a potential person, what should we say of the somatic cell whose nucleus was transferred to it? Are skin cells potential persons? We begin our discussion in this unit by investigating these pressing philosophical questions in light of the latest scientific research in these areas.

The evils of coercive state eugenics remind us of the importance of reproductive liberty, and particularly of the freedom to have children. But ethical questions can still be raised about decisions to have, or avoid having, a child for certain reasons, and about who should have access to the means enabling such decisions to be made. If a couple uses preimplantation genetic diagnosis to decide which embryo they wish to be implanted, is it immoral for them to select against a particular embryo because it has a genetic predisposition to a particular disability? Conversely, is it wrong to proceed with a pregnancy in cases where an embryo or fetus is likely to be born with very severe disabilities? What, if anything, constitutes a ‘life not worth living’?

Our analysis of these questions leads us to consider the moral significance of parenthood more generally, and genetic parenthood in particular. What is distinctively valuable about reproduction and reproductive liberty that leads us to accept harms or risks to others that we think should not otherwise be tolerated? Some have argued that demands for broader access to assisted reproductive technologies are simply expressions of reproductive consumerism or an overvaluing of genetics, at the expense of the best interests of any resulting children. What are we to make of such critiques? And how should genetic parenthood be understood in light of reproductive cloning, and the possibility of creating ova and sperm from one’s own body cells by in vitro gametogenesis? Some argue that your own biological mother and father would also become the genetic parents, rather than grandparents, of any child of yours created via cloning or via gametogenesis.

End-of-life decisions also raise some fascinating and challenging philosophical issues. Some people believe there is an important moral difference between a death brought about by letting die rather than by killing, or a death foreseen as a side-effect of administering strong pain relief rather than intended as a means to averting further suffering. How successful are recent philosophical critiques of such claims? Patients with early signs of dementia sometimes make advance directives which aim to limit interventions taken at later stages of their dementia. But what if there are serious philosophical doubts about whether such an individual is still the same person at that later stage? Should the directive still apply? At the end of this unit we return to discussions of some questions about the moral status of humans and person that we considered at the beginning of this unit.

Note that PHL3100 will count towards a major in Philosophy and a minor in Bioethics.

Textbooks:

There will be a book of readings available from the Monash Bookshop early in semester.

Philosophy & Bioethics

Undergraduate Studies

Postgraduate Studies

Research

What's Happening

Community Service